Kenny - Humanism vs Anthropomorphism

https://www.youtube.com/embed/blMIAjgAmvs

Additional Information

Category Lecture
Speakers Kenny, Anthony
Year 2014

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Sir Anthony Kenny - 'Humanism vs Anthropomorphism', delivered at the Ian Ramsey Centre - Humane Philosophy Project 2014-2015 Seminar. Chaired by Ralph Weir and Mikolaj Slawkowski-Rode.

Anthropomorphism (applying to non-humans predicates appropriate only to human beings) may seem an ally of humanism: in fact it is its enemy. Anthropomorphic error takes five forms: biological, zoological, technological, institutional, and theological.

Biological anthropomorphism applies to parts of human beings predicates that are applicable only to whole human beings: e.g. Neo-Darwinism. Again, the anthropomorphic fallacy is committed if we attribute to non-human animals the possession of concepts that can only be manifested by language-users. The attribution of human concepts and activities to computers is the currently most popular form of technological anthropomorphism.

Anthropomorphism can operate not only in the sub-human sphere, but also in the superhuman sphere. Predicates appropriate only to individual humans may be applied to social and political institutions. Again, religious believers apply to God many predicates applicable literally only to humans. The metaphorical nature of this attribution is widely accepted, but some mentalistic predicates are held to be literally true of God.

SIR ANTHONY KENNY FBA is a former President of the British Academy and the Royal Institute of Philosophy, a former Master of Balliol, Pro-Vice Chancellor of Oxford and Gifford Lecturer, among many other achievements. His interests lie principally in the philosophy of mind, ancient and scholastic philosophy, the philosophy of Wittgenstein and the philosophy of religion. With Peter Geach, he has made a significant contribution to Analytical Thomism.

For more information about the Humane Philosophy Project, please visit http://www.humanephilosophy.com.